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8
The Demand for Love and the Mediation of
Desire in La traici6n en la amistad

MATIHEW D. STROUD
Marfa de Zayas's comedia, La traici6n en la amistad [Friendship
betrayed], presents us with a truly stunning demonstration of intrigue and
deception in the service of love. Based on the relationships among nine
people, we have women who deceive men, men who deceive women,
women who betray each others' friendships, servants who are quick to
comment on the absurdity of all these machinations, and a final scene in
which most of the principals get married. What distinguishes this play is
the presence of the ninth character, Fenisa, who acts and reacts just as the
other women do before the final scene but who is excluded from the
happy ending. Her situation brings up a number of questions lying just
beneath the surface of the play: Why is it so hard for people to get
togetl}er with the ones they love? What is the relationship between love

and intrigue on the one hand and love and marriage on the other? What
is, after all is said and done, the goal of love? Sex? Marriage? Ego
satisfaction? The answers to these questions are intimately related to the
human condition that has been so provocatively studied by Jacques
Lacan. IIi very different ways, Zayas's play and Lacan's psychoanalytic
theories both serve to illuminate the basic nature of the human subject
and its demands for love.
Of primary importance in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is the idea
of the human subject at whose center is a gap, a lack, constituted during
the mirror phase (six to eighteen months) in which the infant both
rejoices at the realization of body unity and at the same time confronts
the fact that one can never know the primordial unity with another being
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that one felt in the womb with one's mother. As compensation for this
lack of wholeness in the human subject, one creates for oneself a number
of imaginary images of unity, strength, and independence, all of which
struggle in vain to constitute a whole subject. This·register, called by
Lacan the imaginary because of its dependence upon fictional imagos as
the definition of the subject, is directly related to, and even constitutive
of, the ego, the moi (see Lacan 1975, 94-96, 121, 133, 191-94; Lacan
1977, 1-7).
In interpersonal relations, the imaginary manifests itself in posturing,
manipulation, idolatry, defense mechanisms, disguise, deceit, lies,
rivalries, and other forms of intrigue designed to strengthen the
individual's apparent unity in his or her relation to others, and all of
which are closely related to love (Lacan 1975, 130, 134, 141, 162-63,
199-200, 212, 255, 305-6). Indeed, for Lacan, all demands of the subject
are for love; someone in love desperately hopes that the other person, the
object of affection, will be able to fill the void, the lacuna, and validate
the illusion of wholeness to the subject. Because of the inherent lack at
the core of both the subject and the person serving as the love object (the
other), however, no one can fulfill these demands with total satisfaction.
There is always something left over, one's desire, that is insistently
unfulfilled. The satisfaction of a demand does not fulfill (and therefore
does not eradicate) the desire that is constitutive of the human subject.l
At the same time, it is precisely the function of the imaginary, to create
the illusion of wholeness and defend against the inevitable fragmentation
of the subject. One really believes (because it pleases the ego to believe)
that love restores the center to one's being, and a number of characters
note such manifestations of the imaginary: Juan calls Belisa the center of
his soul (602b); Liseo tells Marcia that love can enlarge the soul
("engrandecer el alma" [593a]); Marcia notes that "Naide puede sin
amor/vivir" (590b). At the same time, however, there is a general
understanding in other quarters that these effects are most illusory:
Fabio: 1Bravo amor!
Antonio: 1Brava quimera!
(596b)
[Fabio: A great love!
Antonio: A great illusion !)
The feeling one has in love that the other is capable of completing the
subject is a direct indication that love is by nature intersubjective, just as
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is the subject. Marcia tells Laura, "Gerardo esta en mi alma" (607a)
[Gerardo is in my soul], and Liseo points out very clearly his belief that
be lives and dies by the other:
si no vivo, <.c6mo miento?
vivo solo donde estAs,
porque donde no estAs muero.
(595a)2
[if I am not alive, how can I lie?
I live only where you are
because where you are not I die.]
Of course, any mention of intersubjectivity in a Lacanian context also
alludes to the Hegelian relationship between slave and master, a
metaphor also found in discussing love, as when Juan tells Belisa:
Pues ya vengo a que me veas
y me mandes como a esclavo.
(618a; see also 602a; 607b)

[I have come for you to see me
and command me as a slave.].
The very impossibility that another person will truly fill in all the gaps
and cuts in the structure of the subject makes all the perceived benefits
(happiness, completeness, unity, harmony, etc.) only impossible longings
of the ego. This impossibility is eloquently described in this sonnet with
which Marcia opens Act II:
Amar el dfa, aborrecer el dfa,
Hamar la noche y despreciarla luego,
temer el fuego y acercarse el fuego,
tener a un tiempo pena y alegrfa.
Estar juntos valor y cobardfa,
en desprecio cruel y el blando ruego,
temor valiente, entendimiento ciego,
atada la raz6n, libre osadfa.
Buscar lugar donde aliviar los males
y no querer del mal bacer mudanza.
desear sin saber qu� se desea.
Tener el gusto y el disgusto iguales
y todo el bien librado en esperanza,
si aquesto no es amor, no re qu� sea.

(599a)
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To love the day, to hate the day
to s ummon the night and then despise it,
to fear ftre and draw near ftre,
to feel pain and happiness at the same time.
To join valor and cowardice,
in cruel disdain and sweet solicitation,
valiant fear, blind understanding,
refrained reason, unrestrained daring.
To seek a place to alleviate maladies,
and not to want the malady to change,
to desire without knowing what is desired.
To have pleasure and displeasure equally
and all good joined to hope,
if that is not love I do not know what is.
,

Given the fruitlessness of the search for happiness in love, it is not
surprising that Belisa talks of the cruelty and pain of love (60la, 601b),
Liseo complains about its harshness and resistance to reason (610a),
Lucfa mentions the suffering it causes (615b), Laura angrily comments
on the effects of love ("Muerte, rabia, I cuidados, ansias y tormentos,
celos" [Death, fury, cares, anxieties and torments, jealousy) [609a)), and
Fenisa uses metaphors of being lost at sea (590b). Closely related is the
metaphor of love as death, as i n Juan's words, "l,Porffas I en darme la
muerte, ingrata?" [Do you persist in giving me death, ingrate?] and "Tras
ti voy, fiera, I que por amarte me has muerto" [I follow you, beast,
because you have killed me for loving you) (592b), and in this tercet by
Gerardo:

Con su dicha se alegre el venturoso
y con su amada el vencedor amado,
y el que busca imposibles, cual yo, muera.

(596b; see also 598b, 609b, 614a)
[Let the fortunate one be content with his happiness,

and the beloved conqueror with his lady love,
and let him who seeks the impossible, as I do, die.).
Of course, just as the pleasure is only imaginary, so too is the death. Of
course, because love is so integrally related to ego illusions, there is
really no difference between love and deceit, and Fenisa herself is the
proof of it As long as love remains unmediated, i t can be nothing other
than deception and illusion, as we see in Juan's words to Fenisa:
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ya s6 tus tretas, sirena,
que ya en tu engafio y mi pena

hace sus suertes amor.
(592a)

[I know your tricks, siren,
for with your deception and my pain
love plays its games.]

Fenisa deceives Juan by stringing him along when he is fed up with her
fickleness (592b) and in order to prompt Juan to ask for Marcia (594a-b),
but she is far from being the only character to resort to deception: Laura
enters covered by a manto (599a) and deceives Liseo by pretending to be
Marcia (611a); Marcia pretends to be a friend of Laura's whom she met
in a convent (600b-601a) and feigns a decision to become a nun (601a);
Liseo dishonored Laura with the promise of marriage (599-600); and
Liseo decides to deceive Fenisa, all in an attempt to satisfy desire:
si yo a Fenisa galanteo,
es con engafios, burlas y mentiras,
no mas de por cumplir con mi deseo.

(603b)
[if I court Fenisa,
it is with deceit, mockery and lies,
jus t to fulfill my desire.]
Here we might also bring in the topos of love as an enchantment, as
with Le6n's questions to Liseo:
di, i.sabes encantamentos?
i,COn qu6 bechizas esta gente?
l,traes algun grano de helecho?

Marcia, te adora y estima;
Fenisa, por ti muriendo.
(595a)

[Tell me, do you now any spells?
How do you bewitch these people?

Do you have some spores of maiden-hair fern?
Marcia loves and admires you,
Fenisa is dying for you.]
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Almost anything can serve as a lure to capture the subject in the
imaginary register: clothing, locks of hair, ribbons, headdresses, skirts all of which are mentioned by Le6n in his catalog of examples of the
uncertain nature of love (616b-617a). Perhaps even more important (at
least in their frequency in the comedia) are letters and portraits. A letter
can easily become a lure, as when Liseo treats a letter he received as a
religious relic (594b), and when Marcia, in the same letter, admits the
effect his portrait had on her:

En tu retrato mire
las partes que te dio el cielo,
y al fin por ojos y ofdos
me dio el amor su veneno.
(595a)
[In your portrait I saw
the features that heaven gave you,
and at last, through my eyes and ears,
love gave me its poison.]
Since love is an imaginary enterprise, it is not at all surprising that almost
any tokeri of love can serve as a powerful lure for the subject who thinks
that the other can fill the lack (see Lacan 1975, 141-42, 158).
Perhaps the most frequent lure found in this play is the look of the
other, the gaze that opens up for the subject the realization that one is not
complete.3 There are abundant examples of the role of the eyes in love
(as in the expressions, "puso los ojos en mf' [he put his eyes on me] and
"aquel veneno que dicen I que se bebe por la vista" [that poison that is
said to be drunk with the eyes] [590a]). Marcia is in love with Liseo at
the beginning because she has seen him and has his portrait (590b-591a).
She even goes so far as to say, "me obliga I toda la gala que he visto" [all
the finery I have seen obliges me] (590b). 4 That the gaze is a potent lure
is demonstrated in Marcia's statement:

(.que pierdo en ser de unos ojos
cuyas agradables nifl.as
tienes cautivas IMs almas
que tiene arenas la Libia . ..?
(591a)
[What do I lose in belonging to eyes
whose pleasant pupils
have captured more souls
than Libya has sand?]
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Because Fenisa also loves Liseo, or at least she says she does at the
beginning (591a), she too calls his eyes "ojos de hechizos llenos" [eyes
full of enchantments]. Just as in the case of the metaphorical equivalence
of love and death, the look of the other can also be eq uated with one's
life, one's imaginary subject, as in this sonnet pronounced by Laura at
the end of Act I:
Que muera yo, Liseo, por tus ojos
y que gusten tus ojos de matarme;
que quiera con tus ojos alegrarme
y tus ojos me den cien mil enojos.
Que rinda yo a tus ojos por despojos
mis ojos, y ellos en Iugar de amarme
pudiendo con sus rayos alumbrarme
las flores me convierten en abrojos.
Que me maten tus ojos con desdenes,
con rigores, con celos, con tibieza,
cuando mis ojos por tus ojos·mueren,
jAy! dulce ingrato que en los ojos tiene
tan grande deslealta� como belleza,
para unos ojos que a tus ojos quieren.
(598b)

[Let me die, Liseo, by your eyes,
and let your eyes enjoy killing me;
let me want to be happy in your eyes
and let your eyes give me a hundred thousand complaints.
Let me surrender my eyes to yours
as spoils, and they, instead of loving me,
being able to enlighten me with their rays,
change flowers into thistles for me.
Let your eyes kill me with disdain,
with severity, with jealousy, with indifference,
when my eyes die by your eyes.
Ob! Sweet ingrate whose eyes hold
as great a disloyalty as they do beauty
for some eyes that love your eyes.)
Even the familiar question, "(,QU� es lo que veo?" [What is this I see?]
(592a), can be interpreted in l ight of the gaze, but in inverted form. What
I see is not in the least important except in that it serves as a lure to
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captivate the ego (see Lacan 1978, 93, 102-3). Of course, like all
imaginary lures, the look is inevitably a source not of certainty but of
meconnaissance: "the level of reciprocity between the gaze and the gazed
at is, for the subject. more open than any other to alibi" (77).
There is a concrete link between deception and its manifestations as
travesty, camouflage and masquerade, and violence- a rivalry to the
death.s Rivalry is, of course, one of the hallmarks of the imaginary
register. One does not happen to desire the same object as another
person; one desires it because the other person does. Marcia hits exactly
on the nature of rivalry when she hopes that Laura does not have the
same love object as she:

Laura bella, por mi vida
que no tengais m i deseo.
(599b)
[Beautiful Laura, upon my life,
may you not have my desire.]

As usual, Fenisa is the worst offender. One of her main characteristics is
her rivalry with the other women, her alleged friends, which gives rise to
the charge of treason in the title. When she hears Marcia talking about
her love for Liseo, she reacts by saying that she, too, loves Liseo, and
that she cannot believe the coincidence (591a). At the same time, Fenisa
is also immensely jealous of the women who receive the attentions of her
suitors after she has tired of them.
Not too far removed from rivalry is revenge. Marcia wants to take her
revenge for Fenisa's betrayal (600b). Belisa wants revenge on Juan
because he tricked her (601a). Laura wishes Liseo dead because of his
alleged love for Fenisa (611a). Juan even wanted to kill Fenisa (608a),
but rather than kill her (because people would accuse Belisa), he decided
to shame her, saying,
as£ se castigan

a las mujeres que intentan
desatinos semejantes
y que a los hombres enredan.

(608a)
thus are punished
women who undertake
similar foolishness
and who ensnare men.
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Fenisa, for her part, threatens to punish Juan for his deceptions (592b),
says that many lovers fit in her soul (605a), and vows to take revenge on
men's deceptions by toying with them. Later (614a), she says she wants
revenge on everyone, at one point even threatening death (618b).
Up to this point, all the characters seem to engage in the same kinds of
intrigue, deception, rivalry, and revenge. Where Fenisa differs from the
others is primarily in her wish to keep all the men as her love objects
without settling on any one of them. She is almost like Diana in Lope's

El perro del hortelano; she will not commit to any one man, but she will
not willingly allow the other women their commitment. As can
frequently happen, the ego will not permit another's ego to treat it the
way it treats others. Despite her endless intrigues that involve the other
characters, Fenisa cannot stand that the men might be toying with her.
One gets the distinct impression that with Fenisa, the goal is not sexual,
at least in some sense; as soon as a man gives up his interest in another
woman and begins to pay attention to her, she abandons him. Rather, her
behavior is much more characteristic of repetition, grounded, as Lacan
notes, "first of all in the very split that occurs in the subject in relation to
the encounter" (Lacan 1978, 69). She functions exclusively at the level of
the imaginary, which is why she is able to say that she really does love
all the men:
y aunque a mi don Juan adoro
quiero tambi�n a Liseo
porque en rni alma hay Iugar
para amar a cuantos veo.
Perdona, amistad, que amor
tiene mi gusto subjeto,
sin que pueda Ia raz6n,
ni mande el entendimiento;
tantos quiero cuantos miro,
y aunque a ninguno aborrezco
este que rniro me mata.

(594b; see also 605b, 614a)
[and although I adore my Don Juan,
I also love Liseo
because in my soul there is room
to love as many as I see.
Forgive me, friendship, for love
has subjected my pleasure,
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without empowering reason
nor giving the rule to understanding
I love everyone I see.
and although I hate no one,
this one I see kills me.]
At the same time. she appears to realize that her quest is ultimately
doomed to fail when she says "por los dem�s me pierdo" [I am lost for
the rest] (614b), adding that if any one of them left her she would be
empty. Lucfa echoes her feeling that this cannot last:
pues no es mucho que penes,
que dar gusto a tantos hombres
imposible me parece.
(615b)
[since it is not much for you to suffer,
because to please so many men
seems impossible to me.]
Fenisa is in some important ways a female Don Juan: she wants the ego
satisfaction of the hunt and conquest without the long-term commitment
of marriage.
Marriage allows one to escape from the endless illusions of the ego in
the imaginary register. As such, it is the most significant representation
of the symbolic register in the comedia. The speaking subject, because of
its acceptance of the symbolic order, is able to mediate its desires
through language and the other constructs that the community (society,
civilization) provide as a promise of completeness. The "Name of the
Father" (also in French the "no" of the father, nom-non) mitigates
without eliminating the posturing, defensiveness, and rivalry of the ego
in the imaginary. One accepts the limitations of the law (in a symbolic
castration)- that is, one gives up some of one's imaginary fantasies for
the promise of peace and order in a symbolic structure. But in order to
find one'·s place in the symbolic order, one must also give up a great deal
of one's illusory, imaginary happiness. The subject fades as it "loses
itself' in the constructs of the symbolic, a notion quite different from the
metaphorical use of "perderse" in the imaginary that was mentioned
earlier. When Fenisa says early on that she is "lost" on account of Llseo
(591a), she is alluding to her status as lost on the one hand because the
illusion of wholeness is shattered (her love for him has allowed chinks to
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appear in the armor of her ego defenses), while on the other hand she is
lost in the image itself and needs the mediation of the symbolic. Actually,
one loses either way, as Fenisa herself admits when she says, "yo me
tengo de perder" (615b). Every time a person makes a choice between
two possibilities, there is a loss. In an absolute sense, there is no such
thing as a truly happy ending.
It would seem surprising at first glance that this mediation of desire,
this denial of the illusory satisfaction of the invincible ego, is what most
of the characters in this play accept Yet, by the final curtain, Liseo and
Laura, Marcia and Gerardo, Belisa and Juan, and Luda and Le6n are all
engaged to be married (619a-b). Even more, whereas the men in the play
seem to view marriage as the next step in the satisfaction of their
demands for love,6 the women in the play, except for Fenisa, are actively
seeking the symbolic. They want to get married, to trade their individual
fantasies for the collective security of society. Marcia describes the
mitigation of desire by the symbolic in terms of its benefit as an escape
from the imaginary traps:

promete ser su esposo
y amansarAs su rostro desdenoso,
en un papel fmnado
en que diga: prometo yo, Liseo,
por dejar confirmado
con mi amor y flllileza mi deseo
ser, senora, tu esposo.
(6llb)
[promise to be her husband
and you will tame her disdainful countenance
with a signed paper
in which you say: I, Liseo, promise,
in order to confirm my love
with love and steadfastness,
to be, Lady, your husband.)
Of course, there really is no alternative except to continue to be driven
by one's ego fantasies, amass an extraordinary amount of personal
power, and create almost impenetrable defenses against attack (or
liaison) with others, but the price is being forever alone. Since no one can
really fill the void, can really "make one happy," one inevitably ends up
with no one, which is precisely the situation of Fenisa, whose goal, rather
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than marriage, was to be the "extremo de las mujeres" [most extreme
woman] ( 60 6 b). In her seeming unwillingness to allow her desires to be
mitigated by the symbolic, Fenisa is consumed by the always frustrated
attempt to please her ego in love. Still, she is distraught at being left
alone at the end of the play. Her ego satisfaction came from having the
gaze of many men without returning any of them. As long as everyone
operated only in the imaginary, she could get away with the deceptions,
but once the symbolic mediation began (the bridling of passion, the
coupling for matrimony), her deceptions, her ego, her resistance to the
symbolic, became her downfall.
For the other women, Fenisa's exclusion for the symbolic apotheosis
is a punishment for her having betrayed them in their friendship:

Fenisa, tus maldiciones
que no alcancen no creas,
pues de tu mal nadie tiene
Ia culpa, sino tll mesma.
Las amigas desleales
y que hacen estas tretas,
pocos son estos castigos;
consutlate y ten paciencia.

(619b-620a)

[Fenisa, do not believe that
your curses have no effect,
since no one is to blame for your
unhappiness except yourself.
For disloyal girlfriends
who engage in these schemes,
these punishments are few indeed:
console yourself and be patient.]
In fact, the alleged treason of the title is really only meaningful once the
other characters have entered into the symbolic. When everyone was
consumed by their imaginary intrigues, all was fair in love. Rivalry is to
be expected in the imaginary; indeed, even those who later blamed
Fenisa for her "treason" were guilty of it themselves, as Fenisa correctly
noted when she accused them earlier of "traici6n en tanta amistad"
(606b). But in the symbolic, treason is a violation of the law, an exit from
the comfortable world of desire, mediated by language, to the hopeless
realm of irremediable lack, the ultimate impossibility of completeness.
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Although this conflict is depicted in the play as one between love and
friendship (59lb, 594b), the difference really lies in the ongoing and
ever-present tension between the symbolic and the imaginary. Both
friendship and love are demands that point to the structuring desire at the
center of the human subject. They have both imaginary (see Belisa's
words on 599b: "cautivrus mi voluntad" [you capture m y will]) and
symbolic elements. In both, one can abide by the rules and submit one's
desires to the symbolic, or suffer the illusions, the rivalries, the revenge,
and the appearance of independence of the imaginary. Fenisa, like
everyone else, wants it all. Unfortunately, she never learns that the
promise of happiness in the symbolic is the best she can do, and that the
endless search for ego satisfaction can never fill the void at the center of

her being.

Notes
1. Lacan takes great pains to delineate needs, demands, and desires. Needs
are biological (sleep, food, sex) and, therefore, exist in every organism.
Demands are always for love and are thus symptomatic of a basic intersubjectiv
ity. They are also enormously misleading, because what one demands is never
what one wants (Schneiderman 1983, 113). In a sense, desire lies between need
and demand; there is something in the subject (its passage through what Lacan
calls the "deflles" of the signifier - castration, the law, language, the signifying
chain - that forbids the direct satisfaction of needs in a closed system, such as
one finds among animals [Lacan 1977, 264]). At the same time, desire arises
from the gap or lack at the core of the subject that precludes the satisfaction of
demands. Desire, by definition, can never be satisfied. The best it can achieve is
mediation through language as the buffer between individuals (see MacCannell
1986, 80; Lacan 1975, 193). One of the most famous Lacanian pronouncements
about desire is the fundamental Hegelian theme that one's desire is the desire of
the other (Lacan 1975, 169); that is, one cannot create a desire (and certainly one
cannot fulfill a desire) outside of the inherent intersubjectivity of the subject in
its relation both to the other (other people and their promise of delivery of the
sought-for object) and to the Other (the symbolic, inhabited by something of the
Real, and its mediating function). While the characters themselves seem to be
unaware of these differences by their indiscriminate use of "deseo," one might
also note that the context in which they are used is illustrative of desire as purely
imaginary before the symbolic mediation of desire through language (Lacan
1975, 193), as in Fenisa's use of "deseo" when she is referring to demand:
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yo te d.irt el deseo
que me mueve, y es Liseo
el nombre.
(592a)
[I shall tell you the desire
that moves me, and its name
is Liseo.)
2. There are numerous textual references t o concepts of Jove involving
something of the other: that love is a god (590a) or Cupido (613b); that it is an
independent force in the universe (607a); and that it is subject to fortune, also
beyond the control of the subject (609b, 610a. 61lb). All of these typical
characterizations of love imply an otherness that is ultimately unassimilable by
the person in love.
3. Lacan's discussions of the gaze are quite involved and cannot be
adequately dealt with here. In short, one can note that the gaze has effects both
in the imaginary (as is mentioned here) and in the real (the register of the
impossible and unanalyzable gap or lack at the center of the speaking subject). It
can function as a lure in the imaginary or as a disorienting intrusion of the Other
in the imaginary and symbolic structures that desperately try to cover over the
lack. There might be some relationship between the look of the other as
representative of the real gaze that disorients and causes the subject to vanish in
a point (see Lacan 1978, 83) and the imaginary capture of the gaze that prompts
so much ego activity. The ego tries to protect itself against the reality that its
strength and integrity are only imaginary. What makes a subject a subject is the
desire and the split that causes it, that is awakened by the gaze (see Lacan 1978,
84-85). In the realm of the visible, the gaze is the objet a, and it is part of the
scopic drive, which is related to the desire of the Other. Of great importance is
the fact that it is not merely a matter of the subject's seeing the other, or the
subject's being seen by the other, but rather that one sees oneself being seen by
the other. In a real sense, one is defmed by the gaze of others, of the Other (see
Lacan 1975, 243-49; Lacan 1978, 73, 83, 88-89, 105-6). Lacan also presents a
rather lengthy discussion of the optics of the gaze, including the necessary
difference between appearance and being, noting that the scopic drive is the
most susceptible to error (XI 77, 83), thus leading us back into the area of the
imaginary constructs created by these people who fall in love through the eyes.
4. Other examples of eyes and their amorous effects can be found in the
speeches of Marcia (590a, 59la, 59lb, 599b, 610a. 618b), Juan (59lb, 592b,
602a, 602b, 607a, 618b), Fenisa (594b, 606a, 619a), Liseo (595a, 596a, 603b,
604b), Gerardo (596b, 609b), Laura (598b, 599a-b, 600a), Belisa (599b, 603a,
609b, 618a, 6 18b), Le6n (604b, 612a, 618b), and Lucfa (605b).
5. Lacan (1978, 99-100) goes into some depth regarding the nature of
rivalry and Caillois's defmitions of mimicry, noting in particular the direct
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connection between deception and "a certain sexual finality" (100). For more on
rivalry and its connection to the desire of the subject for the object, see Lacan

1975, 169, 193, 199-200.

6. Characters in general, both here and in other comedias, believe they are
marrying as a logical extension of their imaginary attraction, or love. Liseo
decides that he will marry Marcia, noting her enchantments: her "hacienda"
[estate], her nobility, her beauty, and her u n u s ua l understanding
("entendimiento") (603a); Juan proposes marriage to Belisa because he believes
she is the center of his life (602b), and Belisa is really happy once talk of
marriage comes up because "don Juan fue siempre de mi gusto" [Don Juan was
always to my liking) (607a)
.
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